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Abstract—Radio frequency (RF) fingerprint is the inherent
hardware characteristics and has been employed to classify and
identify wireless devices in many Internet of Things (IoT) appli-
cations. This paper extracts novel RF fingerprint features, designs
a hybrid and adaptive classification scheme adjusting to the
environment conditions, and carries out extensive experiments
to evaluate the performance. In particular, four modulation
features, namely differential constellation trace figure (DCTF),
carrier frequency offset, modulation offset and I/Q offset ex-
tracted from constellation trace figure (CTF), are employed. The
feature weights under different channel conditions are calculated
at the training stage. These features are combined smartly with
the weights selected according to the estimated signal to noise
ratio (SNR) at the classification stage. We construct a testbed
using universal software radio peripheral (USRP) platform as
the receiver and 54 ZigBee nodes as the candidate devices to
be classified, which are the most ZigBee devices ever tested.
Extensive experiments are carried out to evaluate the classifi-
cation performance under different channel conditions, namely
line-of-sight (LOS) and non-line-of-sight (NLOS) scenarios. We
then validate the robustness by carrying out the classification
process 18 months after the training, which is the longest time
gap. We also use a different receiver platform for classification
for the first time. The classification error rate is as low as 0.048
in LOS scenario, and 0.1105 even when a different receiver is
used for classification 18 months after the training. Our hybrid
classification scheme has thus been demonstrated effective in
classifying a large amount of ZigBee devices.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, RF fingerprint, device
classification, Internet of Things
I. INTRODUCTION
THE ubiquitous connections have significantly trans-formed our everyday life by connecting people, ma-
chine, and environment together through a wireless manner,
which have triggered many exciting Internet of Things (IoT)
applications such as smart city, smart healthcare, intelligent
transportation etc. [1]–[3]. Identity authentication is essential
in wireless communications to validate whether the users
are legitimate, which is conventionally maintained by clas-
sical cryptography-based authentication techniques [4]. These
schemes usually employ IP or MAC addresses as the identity,
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which can be tampered or attacked [5]. In addition, crypto-
graphic algorithms usually rely on complicated mathematical
operations or protocols [6], while many IoT devices are low
cost and sensitive to computational complexity. Take industrial
IoT applications, such as environmental monitoring as an
example. A star network topology is very suitable to connect
low cost devices [7], where a host is usually employed to
collect data from sensors. These sensors could be scattered in
a vast field and will have to work for many years (e.g., ten
years) with non-rechargeable batteries. While the host needs
to authenticate the information source, it is very challenging
for the sensors to support complex cryptography-based au-
thentications with the limited energy. It is also not practical to
update the pre-shared key or algorithm in these sensors. There-
fore, a lightweight authentication and identification solution is
urgently needed for the IoT.
Radio frequency (RF) fingerprint is an inherent character-
istic of wireless device itself and can hardly be changed [8]–
[11]. Similar to the human fingerprint, the RF fingerprint can
be adopted to identify and classify wireless devices, which
has been an emerging technique for wireless security. The RF
fingerprint-based identification usually consists of two stages,
namely the training and classification. At the training stage,
the host receiver will first sample received signals from the
devices under good channel quality, extract features, and save
them as a template for reference. During the classification
stage, the receiver will obtain signals from candidate devices,
compare the same type features with the template, and classify
the devices based on the similarity between these features.
The RF fingerprint is inherently affiliated at the transmitted
signal of the end devices, which does not cost any additional
energy. On the other hand, the host is usually equipped with
sufficient computational resources, which is capable to identify
devices according to various RF fingerprint features residing
in the received signals. The asymmetry of the computational
resources and capabilities among host and end devices are very
common in the IoT. Because the RF fingerprint identification
does not require complicated mathematical operations from the
end devices, it is extremely suitable to IoT. Therefore it has
been reported with many prototypes and applications among
various wireless systems, including UWB [12], GSM [13],
LTE [14], WiFi [15]–[18], ZigBee [19]–[23], Bluetooth [24],
RFID [25], wireless audio communications [26], and so on.
Feature extraction determines the type of RF finger-
print that can be used for classification. The state-of-the-
art RF fingerprint-based identification methods can be gen-
erally summarized into three categories, namely transient-
based techniques, spectrum-based techniques, and modulation-
2based techniques. The transient-based methods measure the
turn-on/off transient or transmitting RF signal variations for
device identification1, e.g., the envelope of the transient sig-
nal [15], [18], [20], [22]–[24] and the phase offset [27].
However, this method is extremely sensitive to the device
position and antenna polarization direction [28], which limits
the practical implementations. Moreover, high performance
equipments with good receiver sensitivity and linearity, e.g.,
oscilloscope and spectrum analyzer, are essentially required
to extract transient features from the received signal [19],
[20], [28], [29], which significantly increases implementa-
tion cost. Low-cost equipments such as universal software
radio peripheral (USRP) may compromise the classification
performance [17], [30]. Signal spectrum is another important
device fingerprint feature, e.g., received signal spectrum of
802.11 WiFi devices [17], [31], power spectrum density (PSD)
of RFID tags or UWB devices [25], [32]. However, the
performance of spectrum-based identification may deteriorate
when channel condition changes [33]. In particular, when the
receiver signal to noise ratio (SNR) decreases, the background
noise will submerge signal PSD. Modulation-based methods
extract stable features from the received signal, including
auto gain control (AGC) responds [34], amplifier nonlinearity
characteristics [35], sampling frequency offset [36], carrier
frequency offset [36]–[41], distance vector [14], etc. These
modulation-based features can be extracted in the baseband
by using low cost devices, such as USRP. It is interesting
to investigate these features and further integrate lightweight
authentication in baseband signal processing.
Classification algorithm design is another key aspect of the
RF fingerprint-based identification, which defines the method-
ology to classify the devices based on the extracted features.
The classifier can be equipped with advanced tools such as
artificial neural networks (ANN) and support vector machines
(SVM) [20], which, however, may require a sophisticated
training process. Statistical approaches including multiple
discriminant analysis (MDA) [20] and linear discriminant
analysis (LDA) [40] are also adopted but Gaussian distribution
liked input features are assumed which may not always be
valid [20]. Multiple features can be combined to improve the
classification performance [16], [36]. For example, the work
in [36] can achieve a classification rate of 47% by combing five
features together with 93 candidate WiFi devices. On the other
hand, the best classification rate is 26% when only one single
feature is used. However, the performance is far from making
a reasonable and meaningful decision, which is partly because
only a simple linear combination of these features is used [16],
[36]. A lightweight yet effective classifier combining multiple
features in a smarter way is urgently required.
Finally, more comprehensive experimental investigations are
required to demonstrate and validate the feasibility and robust-
ness of RF fingerprint-based identification. Many prototype
systems only involve a limited number of test devices, usually
less than 10, for evaluations. For example, only six devices are
tested in [30]. There are efforts to increase the test samples
but the performance is not satisfactory. For example, the work
1We use identification and classification interchangeably in this paper.
in [36] tries to classify 93 WiFi devices but the error rate is
as high as 53%. In addition, the experiments are extremely
sensitive to environmental conditions, including the presence
of line-of-sight (LOS) or different emitter locations [28], [33],
[42]. Moreover, the training and classification usually will not
be carried out at the same time period or with the same
receiver. For example, the training set can be provided by
the manufacturer of the hardware devices as a database to
the customers who will have to use another receiver platform
for classification. The evaluation in [36] spans over three
weeks, which are not long enough. More investigations under
these circumstances are thus essential to demonstrate that RF
fingerprint-based identification is applicable.
This paper proposes a hybrid device classification scheme
based on multiple RF fingerprint features to classify ZigBee
devices and carries out extensive experiments to evaluate
the performance. In particular, we employ four modulation
features, namely differential constellation trace figure (DCTF),
carrier frequency offset, modulation offset and I/Q offset
extracted from constellation trace figure (CTF). We also design
a hybrid classifier scheme to adaptively combine different fea-
tures according to the channel SNR. A testbed is constructed
by a low-cost USRP software defined radio (SDR) platform
as the host receiver and 54 CC2530 ZigBee nodes as the
target devices to be classified, which are the most ZigBee
devices ever tested. Compared to other existing work, we
carry out much more extensive experiments to investigate the
classification performance under different channel conditions,
different experiment time and two receiver platforms, which
is the first work to demonstrate the robustness of the RF
fingerprint features with such experimental conditions. The
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We propose to extract novel RF fingerprint features.
DCTF is a new feature that can be obtained using
differential of the received signals and processed by
image recognition algorithms. Frequency offset is found
to be distinguishable even at very low SNR but with
slight variations at different measurements. Finally, CTF
contains detailed information of the modulation offset
and I/Q offset. These four features are proved to be very
effective for classifications.
• We design a hybrid classifier by adjusting feature weights
according to the channel conditions. The weights are
pre-calculated with different channel SNR during the
training stage. The corresponding weights are selected
for classification based on the estimated SNR. To the
best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first classifier
integrating RF fingerprint features with weights adjusted
adaptively according to channel conditions.
• We evaluate our proposed method with extensive exper-
iments and demonstrate the robustness against channel
conditions, experimental time and receiver platforms. We
verify the performance under both LOS scenario and
non-line-of-sight (NLOS) scenario, with a classification
error rate of 0.0488 and 0.0941, respectively. We carry
out classification experiments 18 months after the train-
ing with the same receiver, which is the longest time
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NOTATIONS USED THROUGHOUT THE PAPER
Notation Definition
y(t) Received signal
d(t) Signal after differential process
λ Differential interval for DCTF
ε I/Q phase mismatch distortion for DCTF
ΦM,N Measurement matrix from DCTF
ΩM,N Sensing matrix
Γl The lth mean of points in ΩM,N−→
Γ Vector of clustering centers from DCTF
∆̂f coarse Estimated coarse frequency offset
∆̂ffine Estimated fine frequency offset
∆̂f Estimated total frequency offset
ψ̂ Estimated phase offset
χn Fan-shaped section in CTF
Nχ Number of the fan-shaped sections
Nχn Number of received samples in each section χn
Cχn Average center of samples dropped into the χn−→
R Vector of CTF distortion
(MI ,MQ) Estimated I/Q offset from CTF−→
Θ Feature group
γ SNR
η Intra-class variance
ξ Inter-class variance
ζ Ratio between intra-class and inter-class variances
ωγp Weight of pth feature at SNR γ
gap reported, and the error rate is only a little worse,
increasing to 0.0546. We use a different receiver for
classification for the first time and the error rate is 0.1105.
The performance is much better than other work.
The DCTF-based RF fingerprint identification method is first
proposed in our previous work [43]. This paper significantly
extends by proposing a hybrid classifier integrating multiple
RF fingerprint features, and performing a much more extensive
experimental validation.
The notations and their definitions used in this paper are
summarized in Table I. The remainder of this paper is or-
ganized as follows. Section II introduces the experimental
system. Section III presents RF fingerprint features and their
extractions and Section IV designs a hybrid ZigBee device
classification approach. Experimental results are presented in
Section V and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. EXPERIMENTAL SYSTEM
ZigBee is widely used in wireless personal area net-
work with popular IoT applications [44], including health-
care [45], sensor networks [46] and vehicle-to-vehicle commu-
nications [47]. The ZigBee protocol uses the IEEE 802.15.4
as the physical layer technique, in particular, the Offset-QPSK
(OQPSK) modulation [48]. The preamble consists of 32-
bit zeros, which is used for synchronization. It uses direct-
sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) coding and the chip length
Nchip = 32 when the system runs at 2.4 GHz.
The experimental system is shown in Fig. 1, which works at
2.4 GHz industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) band. We aim
to classify 54 TI CC2530 ZigBee modules. USRP platforms
with daughterboards UBX are used as receivers for capturing
RF signals with a sampling rate of 10 Msample/s [49]. We
sample 120 symbols of the physical layer waveform, which
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. (a) Photo of 54 target ZigBee devices. (b) Photo of the USRP receiver
platform and PC.
Fig. 2. Feature extraction from DCTF
are used to extract RF fingerprint features in this paper. The
captured baseband signal from USRP is transferred to a PC
and processed off-line.
III. RF FINGERPRINT FEATURES EXTRACTION
In this section, we introduce the extraction of the employed
RF fingerprint features, including (i) DCTF, (ii) frequency
offset, and (iii) CTF features.
A. Differential Constellation Trace Figure Feature
DCTF method plots the differential signals in an I/Q axis
and then employs image processing algorithms to extract the
unique feature of RF signals in terms of different gathering
centers. The flow chart of DCTF extraction is shown in Fig. 2.
A differential process at the receiver is first carried out, which
is given as
d(t) =
(
yI(t) + jyQ(t+ ε)
) · (yI(t+ λ) + jyQ(t+ λ+ ε))∗,
(1)
where yI(t) and yQ(t) are the received baseband signals at I/Q
channels, λ is the differential interval, ε is the introduced I/Q
phase mismatch distortion, and (·)∗ denotes the conjugation
operation. As shown in (1), a small I/Q phase mismatch
distortion ε is deliberately added to enlarge the RF fingerprint
features in DCTF [43]. A delayed version of received signal is
created by adding the differential interval λ. The differential
process is then carried out by a conjugate multiplication
between the received signals and their delayed copies. The
obtained samples after differential process are directly depicted
in an I/Q axis figure, which is named as DCTF.
We can then use image processing algorithms to analyze
the features of the DCTF. The original DCTF is set as M×N
dimension pixel grids. The number of received signal samples
in the pixel (m,n) is denoted as a measurement matrix Φm,n,
which is shown in Fig. 3(a). In order to efficiently extract
features, the measurement matrix is converted to a sensing
matrix with only two-level quantization. A sensing matrix
ΩM,N is adopted and defined as{
Ωm,n = 1, Φm,n ≥ α
Ωm,n = 0, Φm,n < α
, (2)
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Fig. 3. (a) Obtained DCTF of ZigBee device, λ is 1 symbol length and ε is
1/10 symbol length. (b) Clustering centers from DCTF, NL = 4 and α = 6.
where α is the threshold and selected according to the size
of M ×N , number of samples, and noise level. For instance,
the chance of different samples falling into the same pixel
will be lower when the size M × N is larger. In addition,
more samples will be in each pixel when there are more
measurement samples. The noise will also fuzz the pixels with
highly concentrated samples. In this paper, the threshold α is
selected as 6 after a few trying.
The point density of each pixel is an intuitive fingerprint
which can represent the distortions of the wireless device. As
shown in Fig. 3(b), the I/Q phase mismatch causes NL = 4
different clustering region centers, Γl, for Zigbee OQPSK
modulated signals. A detailed derivation can be found in
our previous work [43]. The k-means clustering algorithm
uses least squared Euclidean distance to find the nearest
mean, which is an efficient machine learning algorithm to
get the clustering centers. As the clustering region number
is fixed at 4 for OQPSK modulation and the number of pixels
for clustering on DCTF is small, the k-means clustering is
very suitable because of its easy implementation and low
complexity. Finally, the receiver obtains a feature vector of
clustering centers
−→
Γ = {Γl} for classifications.
DCTF has demonstrated to be effective to distinguish dif-
ferent devices. An example of DCTFs of six ZigBee devices
is shown in Fig. 4. As shown among the figures, the obtained
DCTFs have significant differences among devices. DCTF-
based classification can be achieved by image classification,
which is a popular area of classical pattern recognition. In
this paper, the k-means clustering algorithm is adopted as an
example and advanced pattern recognition techniques can be
employed to improve the performance.
B. Frequency Offset Feature
Carrier frequency offset results from the different oscillator
frequencies at the transmitter and receiver, which is also
a popular parameter for device classification. In this paper,
we introduce an accurate frequency offset estimation method
to classify ZigBee devices. The estimated frequency offset
information can be further used to extract the modulation offset
feature in Section III-C. A block diagram of ZigBee frequency
offset feature and modulation offset feature extraction is shown
in Fig. 5.
1) Coarse Frequency Offset Estimation: There is a pream-
ble sequence in the beginning of the ZigBee packet, which
can be used to estimate coarse frequency offset. The OQPSK
waveform of the preamble sequence, z(n), is first pre-
calculated. A sequence correlation window is selected and
frequency pre-compensation is performed by step-by-step fre-
quency searching, i.e., ∆̂f coarse = fstart + fstep. Finally, the
frequency offset incurring the correlation peak is selected as
the coarse frequency pre-compensation value. The process is
mathematically given as
argmax
∆̂f coarse
Npreamble∑
n=1
| y(t+ nTs) · e−j2pi∆̂f coarsenTs · z∗(n) |, (3)
where Npreamble is the length of the preamble sequence wave-
form, and Ts is the sampling rate.
2) Fine Frequency Offset Estimation: Due to the spread
spectrum technique used in the ZigBee systems, transceiver
can carry out the communication successfully even with slight
carrier frequency offset. Therefore, very few algorithms have
been proposed for ZigBee fine frequency offset estimation.
However, we aim to get a more accurate estimation of carrier
frequency offset in order to improve the classification accu-
racy.
The received signal is firstly compensated with the coarse
frequency offset, which can be given as
y′(t) = y(t)e−j2pi∆̂f coarset. (4)
A peak correlation value is obtained by means of the cross-
correlation between the compensated signal y′(t) and the
known OQPSK spread spectrum chips zi(n), which is math-
ematically given as
argmax
i
Nchip∑
n=1
| y′(Nchip · (k − 1)Ts + nTs) · z∗i (n) |, (5)
where k is the index of ZigBee symbol. For IEEE 802.15.4
standard, there are 16 spread spectrum chips in total.
The chip index returned by (5) is denoted as iCorr. We then
construct a signal s(k) as
s(k) =
Nchip∑
n=1
y′
(
Nchip · (k − 1)Ts + nTs
) · z∗iCorr(n). (6)
The differential value between adjacent s(k) can be given as
d(k) = s(k) · s∗(k + 1). (7)
Finally, we can get the fine frequency offset estimation ∆̂ffine
as
∆̂ffine = angle
( 1
K − 1
K−1∑
k=1
d(k)
)
· 1
2piNchipTs
, (8)
where K is the number of total symbols in estimation. The
total frequency offset of the received ZigBee signal is ∆̂f =
∆̂f coarse + ∆̂ffine.
Moreover, the phase offset can be estimated as
ψ̂ = angle
( 1
K
K∑
k=1
s(k) · e−j2pi∆̂ffinekNchipTs
)
. (9)
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Fig. 4. Six DCTF fingerprints obtained from different ZigBee devices
Fig. 5. Frequency offset feature and modulation offset feature extraction for
ZigBee devices
The received ZigBee signal can be well compensated by the
estimated frequency offset and phase offset.
We carried out the above frequency offset estimation to
54 different ZigBee devices and their frequency offsets are
statistically shown in Fig. 6(a). Most of the devices have the
frequency offset around 40 kHz while some of them have a
frequency offset larger than 100 kHz. Furthermore, frequency
offset is usually considered as a stable RF fingerprint feature
for identifications and classifications [36]–[41], [50], [51],
which may not be valid from our evaluation against working
time. We find that the low-cost ZigBee devices have serious
frequency offset variations even within 15 minutes evaluation.
The frequency offset variations of the first 12 ZigBee devices
are presented in Fig. 6(b). As shown in the figure, the range
of the frequency offset variation varies from 5 kHz to 10 kHz.
In addition, several devices have very similar frequency offset,
e.g., the 4th, 6th, 7th, and 9th device. There will be a very
high chance that different devices have similar frequency offset
features, especially when there are many candidate devices.
Therefore, it is not wise to only use frequency offset feature
for classifications.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. (a) Frequency offset among 54 different ZigBee devices. (b) Frequency
offset variations of the first 12 ZigBee devices.
C. Constellation Trace Figure Features
In practical systems, the amplifier non-linear behavior at the
transmitter will severely distort the RF signal, which will cause
non-linear signal offset at the receiver, including I/Q offset and
phase offset. These features are usually extracted from the
classical constellation map. However, constellation map only
depicts the samples at the decision point, which can hardly
illustrate the sample trace variations from one decision point
to the next decision point. We deem that these trace variation
is another important feature of wireless device. Therefore, we
propose a new method termed as CTF to extract these features.
1) CTF Plotting and Splitting: We first compensate the
received signal with the estimated frequency offset ∆̂f and
phase offset ψ̂, which is given as
y′′(t) = y(t) · e−j(2pi∆̂ft+ψ̂). (10)
The CTF is obtained by directly plotting y′′(t), which is split
into several sub-sections with following rules: (1) The base
6point of the I/Q axis on CTF is set as a central point and
(2) the CTF is equally split by a fixed angle from the central
point. As a result, the CTF is split into several fan-shaped
sections. For instance, we split the CTF into Nχ = 8 sections
in Fig. 7(a). The nth section is denoted as χn and the number
of received samples in χn is Nχn .
2) Feature Extraction: A measured average center Cχn
of all received samples dropped into the nth section can be
calculated as
Cχn =
1
Nχn
Nχn∑
i=1
y′′(ti)χn , (11)
which can be further employed to extract the modulation offset
features by the following two methods.
The first method extracts features from the obtained average
central Cχn values directly. As the received samples are nor-
malized, the ideal average centers Cn of χn can be calculated
from simulations. In OQPSK, Cn is on the unit circle with
different phases. The overall offset (CO) of the obtained CTF
is calculated as the error vector at each average center, which
is given as
−→
Rn = Cn − Cχn . (12)
The error vector
−→
R represents the overall distortion of the
obtained CTF. An illustration of ideal average center Cn,
measured average center Cχn and error vector
−→
Rn are depicted
in Fig. 7(b).
We can also obtain additional information from the average
central Cχn values. The CTF I/Q offset (IQO) (MI ,MQ) can
be estimated from the average center as
MIn =
Nχ∑
n=1
(
Cχn cos∠Cχn
)
,
MQn =
Nχ∑
n=1
(
Cχn sin∠Cχn
)
,
(13)
where ∠· returns the angle of the variable. An illustration
of obtaining CTF I/Q offset is depicted in Fig. 7(c). As the
modulated OQPSK signal is symmetrical at both I/Q axis, the
sum of I/Q offset (MI ,MQ) should be 0 when the received
ZigBee signal is perfect without any offset. However, in a
practical system, the I/Q offset at the transmitter will affect
each transmitted samples and result in an overall distortion.
Therefore, the obtained results (MI ,MQ) will contain the
inherent offset features, which can be treated as a unique
transmitter RF fingerprint.
Some results of CTF overall offset and I/Q offset are
depicted in Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b), respectively. As shown
in the figures, the ZigBee devices can be clearly distinguished
from the extracted overall offset and I/Q offset. In addition,
the obtained features are very stable among different measure-
ments.
In this subsection, we introduce two feature extraction
methods from CTF. Although the concept of this processing is
not complicated, the most significant advantage is that these
processes can overcome serious noise distortions due to the
central limit theorem. In addition, these feature extraction
methods could also be further extended to other modulation
schemes with similar symmetrical characteristic.
IV. HYBRID CLASSIFICATION
We aim to improve the classification performance by inte-
grating the four features discussed in the above section, namely
clustering centers
−→
Γ , frequency offset ∆̂f , CTF overall offset−→
R , and I/Q offset (MI ,MQ). These features are grouped as
−→
Θ = {Θ1,Θ2,Θ3,Θ4} = {−→Γ , ∆̂f,−→R, (MI ,MQ)}, (14)
and combined using a hybrid classifier for an adaptive classi-
fication. The block diagram of our proposed hybrid classifica-
tion is shown in Fig. 9.
A. Training and Classifier Setup
In the training stage, the receiver collects signals with very
high SNR from target devices, which can be done by near-field
measurements. The receiver will then extract RF fingerprint
and save these features as a template,
−→
ΘR.
We design a hybrid classifier with different feature weights
against SNRs. As shown in Fig. 9, we first capture the
training signals with very high received SNR. Additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) with different power levels is added
to the captured signals to emulate different SNR levels γ.
RF fingerprint features,
−→
Θγ , will be extracted afterward and
weights for different features will be calculated.
A typical classifier design usually involves using intra-
class variances and inter-class variances [52]. We extend the
classifier design to different SNRs. Monte Carlo simulations
are carried out for each SNR in order to obtain accurate
weights. The feature extracted from device k in the jth
simulation with SNR γ is given as
−→
Θγ(k, j). The intra-class
variance ηγp is given as
ηγp (k) =
1
Nd
Nd∑
k=1
1
J
J∑
j=1
(
Θγp(j, k)− Eγp (k)
)2
, (15)
where Eγp (k) =
1
J
∑J
j=1 Θ
γ
p(j, k), J is the total simulation
number, and Nd is the number of devices. Any device wishing
to be classified by the host receiver will have to enroll its
feature during the training stage, we therefore assume that the
receiver is aware of the number of devices. The inter-class
variance ξγp can be calculated by
ξγp =
1
Nd
Nd∑
k=1
(
Eγp (k)− E
γ
p
)2
. (16)
where E
γ
p =
1
Nd
∑Nd
k=1E
γ
p (k). Then a ratio ζ
n
p is defined as
ζγp =
1
Nd
∑Nd
k=1 η
γ
p (k)
ξγp
, (17)
in order to demonstrate the noise influence to the RF finger-
print features. Finally, the weights ωγp for different features at
SNR γ is given as
ωγp =
1
ζγp∑P
p=1
1
ζγp
, (18)
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Fig. 7. (a) CTF plotting and splitting. (b) Obtaining error vector from CTF. (c) Obtaining I/Q offset from the CTF. S.Center means the ideal average center
Cn and M.Center denotes the measured average center Cχn .
(a)
(b)
Fig. 8. (a) Overall offset among 3 different ZigBee devices with 3 measure-
ments. (b) I/Q offset among 12 different ZigBee devices with 5 measurements.
where P is the number of total features, i.e., P = 4 in this
paper.
B. Classification
In the classification stage, the receiver will capture samples
from the candidate devices to be classified, extract RF finger-
print features, and compare these features with the template
Fig. 9. Block diagram of hybrid classifier based on RF fingerprint
from the training stage. Different from schemes employing
advanced classifier such as ANN, SVM, MDA [20], [40], a
very lightweight classifier is introduced in our hybrid clas-
sification system. The receiver first estimates the received
SNR, γˆ, and extracts the features as
−→
Θ γˆ . It will then select
the feature weights, ωγˆp , calculated in the training stage. The
distance between the features is calculated by comparing the
obtained features,
−→
Θ γˆ , and the template features,
−→
ΘR, then
normalized and summed with feature weights. The index is
returned by obtaining the minimum distance. The process can
be mathematically given as
argmin
k1,k2
P∑
p=1
|Θγˆp(k1)−ΘRp (k2)|
ξγˆp
ωγˆp . (19)
When k2 6= k1, a classification error occurs. The classification
error rate β can be defined as
β =
Nerror
Ntest
, (20)
where Nerror is the number of classification error and Ntest is
the number of total tests.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Hybrid Classifier Setup and Performance
The training processing was carried out in June 2016. We
had 54 candidate ZigBee devices for classification. A USRP
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Fig. 10. (a) ζγp , ratios between average intra-class variances and inter-class
variances of each feature at different SNR. (b) Feature weights ωγp of each
feature at different SNR.
X310 was used as a receiver to carry out the training process
by collecting received signals from the 54 ZigBee devices,
which were put very close to the receiver, with LOS between
them. We simulated J = 2500 times in order to obtain
a reliable result. The ratio ζγp and feature weights ω
γ
p are
calculated and shown in Fig. 10(a) and Fig. 10(b), respectively.
The smaller the ζγp is, the more reliable of this feature will be
for classification. We can maintain a look-up table of feature
weights ωγp against SNR γ.
The classifier performance under different SNR levels can
also be evaluated through the setup process, which is shown
in Fig. 11. The classification performance using individual
feature can be calculated in a similar way to (19) and is
shown in the figure as well. As shown in Fig. 11, classification
using single feature varies greatly versus SNR, except the
frequency offset. It is difficult to distinguish 54 ZigBee devices
if only DCTF feature is used. In our previous work, DCTF-
based feature extraction obtains quite good results, i.e., with
a classification error rate as 10%, when there are only 16
ZigBee devices [43]. K-means clustering method is used at the
moment but advanced pattern recognition algorithms can be
adopted to improve the performance, which will be our future
work. The performance of frequency offset-based classification
is very stable even in low SNR scenario such as -5 dB.
However, the classification error rate is always around 0.2,
which is not satisfying. Modulation offset and I/Q offset
from CTF are sensitive to SNR. The performance is quite
good in high SNR environment but deteriorates dramatically
when SNR is lower than 15 dB. Therefore, it is necessary
to introduce adaptive features weights tuned to the SNR
variations instead of fixed weights.
As shown in Fig. 11, the hybrid classification method
achieves a significant performance enhancement. The classi-
fication error rate is less than 0.1 even at 5 dB SNR. This
is because that the SNR affects feature estimation accuracy
in a different manner. The feature weights are trained to the
channel SNR, and the classification performance is improved
by selecting the particular feature weights to integrate the
features according to the estimated SNR. It is worth noting
that the classifier weights are trained strictly following (18)
without any manual intervention. In the low SNR scenario
such as -10 dB, the hybrid method does not perform as well
Fig. 11. Classification error rate of RF fingerprint classification using
individual feature and our proposed hybrid classification method
Fig. 12. Layout of the experimental environment
as the frequency offset-based method, because the increased
inter-class variances of the estimated frequency offset reduce
the frequency offset weight ωγ2 in Fig. 10(b). A more robust
classifier can be designed by adjusting parameters manually,
which will also be our future work.
We also did an empirical complexity evaluation of our
system by calculating the execution time. A PC with Intel
i7-4790, single thread at 3.6 GHz was used to count CPU
time. We used Python 2.7 to build the USRP data control
program and Matlab R2015b for data processing. It took
approximately 560 ms for searching signal, SNR estimation
and preprocessing, 840 ms for feature extraction and 50 ms for
classification. Regarding the feature extraction, the execution
time was 80 ms, 180 ms, and 580 ms for DCTF, frequency
offset, and modulation and I/Q offset feature extractions,
respectively. Although the complexity analysis is not rigorous,
it demonstrates that the overall complexity of our algorithm is
acceptable for practical implementations.
B. Experimental Results
We carried out three experiments to evaluate the classifi-
cation performance, namely robustness against channel condi-
tions, experimental time, and receiver platforms. The layout
of the experimental environment is shown in Fig. 12. For
each device classification, we carried out five measurements
by slightly moving the emitter in order to change chan-
nel conditions (SNR). Within each measurement, nine frame
segments (each with 120 symbols) of ZigBee devices were
obtained. We performed the classification algorithm using each
collected frame segment and finally obtained approximately 45
classification results for each device.
The first classification experiment was carried out in
June 2016, the same time period as the training process. Two
9Fig. 13. Classification error rates of each device in different experiments
different channel conditions were considered, namely
• LOS scenario: The USRP X310 receiver and ZigBee
devices were positioned in the same room. The distance
between them was about 1-3 meters regarding different
emitter locations.
• NLOS scenario: The USRP X310 receiver was positioned
in a room and ZigBee devices were positioned in a
long corridor outside the room. There was not a direct
propagation line between USRP and ZigBee devices
(blocked by the wall). The distance between the USRP
and ZigBee devices was about 5-10 meters regarding
different emitter locations.
The estimated SNR values of LOS and NLOS scenarios
were around 20-25 dB and around 5-12 dB, respectively.
The classification error rates of each device are presented in
Fig. 13. As can be observed from the figure, the classification
under LOS condition generally has a much better performance,
which is reasonable because the SNR is much higher. We
further calculated the total classification error rate, namely, the
number of total false classifications divided by the number of
total tests, which is 0.0448 in LOS scenario and 0.0941 in
NLOS scenario.
The classification is usually not carried out at the same
time with training stage. The RF fingerprint features may drift
along time. Therefore, we carried out the second experiment
in November 2017, i.e., 18 months after the training process,
to test the time stability of the classification performance.
The experiments were performed under a LOS condition and
the same USRP X310 was used as the receiver. The results
are shown in Fig. 13 and the total classification error rate
is 0.0546, which is only a little worse. The RF fingerprint
features are very stable for quite a long time.
Finally, we used another receiver to evaluate the per-
formance when different receivers are used in the training
and classification stages, which can be quite common. The
experiments were also carried out in November 2017 under
LOS condition but using a USRP N210 as the receiver. The
results are shown in Fig. 13 and the total classification error
rate is 0.1105, which is a little worse but still better than the
performance of other work.
C. Results Comparison
RF fingerprint-based identification has received many re-
search interests. We compared our experimental results with
other work, which is summarized in Table II and discussed in
details as follows.
• Number of candidate devices: It is obvious that there
is a higher chance to get a ‘collision’ in identification
when more target devices are present. Most of the
published work only verified their algorithms with less
than 10 ZigBee target devices. We have investigated 54
ZigBee devices, which is the largest quantity of target
devices. This preliminarily verifies the feasibility of RF
fingerprint-based identification in practical IoT systems.
• Experiment environment condition: Most of other work
evaluates their systems under a short distance LOS con-
dition with the exceptions of the work in [33], [34].
However, the classification error rates are very high in
their NLOS experiments even only 10 ZigBee devices
are tested. We evaluated our system under both LOS
scenario and NLOS scenario and both performances are
good. In NLOS experiments, although only SNR degra-
dation is considered in our hybrid classifier, our system
outperforms other existing published NLOS experimental
results. It is possible to introduce multi-path as another
input of the hybrid classifier in order to further enhance
the performance in NLOS scenarios.
• The number of used ZigBee symbols: It is intuitive that
longer time will be taken to obtain sufficient samples
when more symbols are required for identification. We
only use 120 symbols in one ZigBee frame packet,
which is the shortest compared to other work. This result
demonstrates that the receiver could successfully distin-
guish the incoming packets only from their waveforms.
• Receiver platform: We only need low cost USRP as
the receiver, while some classification systems may need
sophisticated equipments, such as oscilloscope or Agilent
E3238S signal monitoring system [20], [28]. In addition,
this is the first work to carry out experiments with
different receivers for training and classification stages.
The classification error rate is 0.1105 when another USRP
receiver is used from the training stage. This result
could support the practical usage of RF fingerprint-based
identification in real IoT environments.
• Template: Our system does not require the same environ-
ment to train the template and carry out the classification.
However, some work does require that the received RF
signals for classification and training are obtained exactly
at the same place, termed as fixed template, which may
not be practical for real experiments [28]. When changed
template is used, i.e., RF signals for classification and
training are obtained at different places, their system can
hardly work [28].
• Stability: To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this
is the first work that investigates the stability of RF
fingerprint with 18 months time gap. The experimental
results demonstrate that the RF fingerprint features re-
main stable over a long term, which is very suitable to
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TABLE II
COMPARISONS OF ZIGBEE DEVICE CLASSIFICATION VIA RF FINGERPRINT
Method Number of Devices Experiment Condition Error Rate Number of Symbols Used Remark
Ours 54 1-3 m LOS 0.04 120 USRP
Ours 54 5-10 m NLOS 0.09 120 USRP
Ours 54 1-3 m LOS 0.05 120 18 month apart, same receiver
Ours 54 1-3 m LOS 0.11 120 18 month apart, different receiver
Knox et al. [34] 3 10 cm LOS 0 NA
Patel et al. [20] 25 10 dB AWGN 0.1 3000 High cost
Patel et al. [30] 6 10 dB AWGN 0.1 1280 USRP
Dubendorfer et al. [22] 9 10 dB AWGN 0.1 1000 High cost
Ramsey et al. [23] 7 10 dB AWGN 0.1 500 High cost
Nguyen et al. [37] 4 NA 0 NA USRP
Knox et al. [42] 5 1.5 m LOS 0.03 2000 USRP
Knox et al. [42] 5 4 m LOS 0.08 2000 USRP
Knox et al. [42] 5 10 m NLOS 0.19 2000 USRP
Boris et al. [28] 50 10 m LOS 0.03 600 Fixed template
Boris et al. [28] 10 40 m LOS 0.03 600 Fixed template
Boris et al. [28] 10 40 m LOS 0.38 600 Changed template
Wang et al. [33] 6 0.1 m LOS 0 1000 USRP
Wang et al. [33] 6 6 m NLOS 0.49 1000 USRP
IoT applications because they are designed to work for
years.
D. Discussion
The experiments in this paper were carried out in a static
setup, although with different distances. Many IoT networks
may be mobile, e.g., vehicular communications. A Doppler
shift of 133 Hz will be created when a car moves at a speed
of 60 km/h and the carrier frequency is 2.4 GHz. However,
it is much smaller compared to the ZigBee frequency offset
estimated in this paper, ranging from 20 kHz to 140 kHz. In
addition, the sampling time required for our identification is
less than 5 ms. The channels are very similar during this period
and the modulation parameters would probably remain the
same. Finally, the movement will change the distance between
the host receiver and the end devices, which will then affect
the channel SNR and have been investigated thoroughly in this
paper.
As RF fingerprint identification exploits features in the
physical layer and its implementation is determined by the
physical layer modulation. The feature extraction proposed
in this paper does not apply directly to other wireless net-
works because of various physical layer modulations. For
example, frequency offset also exists in other networks but
they will adopt different estimation algorithms, e.g., short and
long training symbols-based frequency offset estimation for
IEEE 802.11 a/g/n/ac. However, the hybrid classifier should
work with other networks, because the design methodology is
applicable to any other multiple features-based classification.
Finally, we have carried out extensive experiments, some of
them are first performed in the RF fingerprint identification
area. The experimental methodology of this paper offers a de-
sign guideline to evaluate the performance of any identification
systems.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposed a hybrid classification method by
integrating novel RF fingerprint features in a smart manner and
carried out extensive experiments to evaluate the performance.
The contribution and novelty are three aspects. Firstly, four
novel modulation-based features, namely DCTF, frequency
offset, modulation offset and I/Q offset feature from CTF,
were adopted and found effective in classifying ZigBee nodes.
Secondly, a smart hybrid classifier was designed to adaptively
integrating features with the weights tuned to the channel
conditions. Finally, we constructed a testbed consisting of
a low cost USRP SDR as the receiver platform and 54
ZigBee target devices, which were the most ZigBee devices
tested. Compared to the existing work, much more extensive
experiments were carried out to evaluate the feasibility and ro-
bustness of RF fingerprint-based identification under different
channel conditions, experiment time, and receiver platforms.
Our hybrid device classification scheme has demonstrated
good performances in various experiments. The total classifi-
cation error rate was 0.0448 and 0.0941 under LOS scenario
and NLOS scenario, respectively. The error rate was 0.0546
when the classification and training were carried out 18 months
apart and the time gap is the longest among the literature
to date. Finally, when a different receiver platform was used
at the classification stage from the training stage, the error
rate was 0.1105. It is the first time that a different receiver is
used for classification to validate the robustness. Our classi-
fication performance is better than other reported ZigBee RF
fingerprint-based classification schemes. The future work will
focus on employing advanced pattern recognition algorithms
to improve the DCTF classification accuracy and explore its
applications in other physical layer modulated systems such
as OFDM systems. We will also design a more robust and
hybrid classifier by taking into account of channel influences
11
such as the multipath effect.
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